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COMMENT
―TILL DEATH (OR DOMA) DOES US PART‖:
HOW DOMA IMPOSES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CLASSIFYING AND COERCIVE CONDITION ON FEDERAL
FUNDING IN THE WAKE OF MASSACHUSETTS V. UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Erin Bender*

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are employed by the Massachusetts Department of
Veterans‘ Services (―DVS‖) as one of many staff members responsible for
administering federal funding received from the United States Department
of Veterans Affairs (―VA‖) for the administration of the two veterans‘
cemeteries within Massachusetts. These cemeteries are strictly used for the
burial of veterans, their spouses, and their children. As part of your
position, you review applications for burial submitted by Massachusetts
residents to determine if the applicants are eligible for burial in one of the
two cemeteries. However, Massachusetts‘ receipt of this funding is
conditioned on its compliance with all the regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the VA.
Currently on your desk is an application submitted by Jane and Rhonda
Smith.
Jane and Rhonda have been in a valid marriage (under
Massachusetts law) since 2005. Jane is a retired United States Army
lieutenant who honorably served ten years in South Korea, seven years in

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, Randolph-Macon College
1. The example above, while fictional, is based on one of the factual situations presented by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts as reason to find DOMA unconstitutional in Massachusetts v. U.S.
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Guam, three years in Germany, and a year in Kuwait during Operation Gulf
Storm. She is highly decorated, having earned two Army Commendation
Medals, three Bronze Stars, and six Good Conduct Medals. Jane‘s wife
Rhonda did not serve in a branch of the military but wishes to be buried
with her spouse. According to Massachusetts, Jane and Rhonda are validly
married and, therefore, you should be able to approve their application with
ease. However, there is one problem—the VA has informed DVS that,
according to the federal definition of marriage under the Defense of
Marriage Act (―DOMA‖), VA is entitled to recapture any federal funds if
DVS should decide to bury a non-independently eligible same-sex spouse
of a veteran in the cemetery. You must make a choice: (1) either grant
Jane and Rhonda‘s application and risk having DVS lose federal grant
money provided by the VA for maintenance of the military cemeteries, or
(2) deny Jane and Rhonda‘s application and, effectively, refuse to honor the
validity of their marriage under Massachusetts law.1
Current Spending Clause jurisprudence provides that Congress can
attempt to obtain objectives not within its Article I enumerated powers
―through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal
funds.‖2 However, this power is not unlimited; instead, the Supreme Court
has recognized four limitations imposed upon congressional spending
power.3 One of these is that ―other constitutional provisions may provide
an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.‖4
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court‘s current interpretation of the Spending
Clause falls short because it allows Congress to coerce states into accepting
federal funding in areas where Congress could not directly commandeer the
states and state officials.5 This Note suggests that the Court adopt a new
test that would look at a condition attached to federal funding and
determine whether it is a classifying condition or a coercive condition.6
Under this new test, a classifying condition will be deemed constitutional
unless it violates equal protection principles; a coercive condition, on the
other hand, will usually implicate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.7

1. The example above, while fictional, is based on one of the factual situations presented by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts as reason to find DOMA unconstitutional in Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241(D. Mass. 2010).
2. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
3. Id. at 207–08.
4. Id. at 208.
5. Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Is Marriage Reserved to the
States?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419, 457–58 (1999).
6. E.g., Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1103, 1114 (1987).
7. Id. at 1116.
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On July 8, 2010, in Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health
and Human Services, Judge Tauro of the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts granted Massachusetts‘ motion for summary
judgment by determining that Section Three of DOMA, as applied to
Massachusetts, violates the Tenth Amendment and Congress‘ power under
the Spending Clause.8 According to Judge Tauro, Section Three violates
Congress‘ power under the Spending Clause by ―induc[ing]
[Massachusetts] to violate the equal protection rights of its citizens‖ in
order to receive federal funding such as that provided by the VA to
maintain state veterans‘ cemeteries.9 The Federal Government has appealed
Judge Tauro‘s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit,10 and the Supreme Court will most likely grant certiorari to the
appellate decision. Therefore, Massachusetts presents an opportunity for
the Court to reconsider its Spending Clause jurisprudence and adopt this
new test for unconstitutional conditions.
Part II of this Note provides a short legislative history of DOMA and an
overview of Spending Clause jurisprudence. Part III provides an overview
of Judge Tauro‘s opinion in Massachusetts. Finally, Part IV of this Note
analyzes Section Three of DOMA under the proposed classifying/coercive
condition approach to the Spending Clause and concludes that Section
Three of DOMA would be unconstitutional as either type of condition.
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND SPENDING: AN OVERVIEW OF DOMA AND
SPENDING CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. A Brief History of DOMA‘s Enactment
As early as 1890, the Supreme Court recognized that the ―whole subject
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to
the laws of the States, and not to the law of the United States.‖11 Therefore,
because no established body of federal domestic relations law exists, when
determining who can receive federal benefits under a federal statute, the
federal government will defer to state laws regarding domestic relations
―unless Congress clearly mandates otherwise.‖12 Essentially, Section Three
of DOMA purports to displace this practice of deferring to state law by

8. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D. Mass. 2010).
9. Id. at 248 (alterations in original).
10. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010),
appeal docketed, No. 10–2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 2010).
11. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
12. MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 149 (1997).
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establishing a federal definition of marriage.13 In order to understand why
the 104th Congress determined it necessary to establish a federal definition
of marriage, one must look to the events occurring in Hawaii during the
early 1990s.
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that sex is a suspect
category for equal protection purposes and that Hawaii‘s marriage statute
limiting marriage to one man and one woman is unconstitutional, unless the
state could show ―that (a) the statute‘s sex-based classification is justified
by compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgments of . . . constitutional rights.‖14 Three years later,
and fearful that recognition of same-sex marriage was ―imminent‖ in
Hawaii, Congress enacted DOMA,15 whereupon President Clinton signed it
into law on September 21, 1996.16 Section Three of DOMA provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies
of the United States, the word ―marriage‖ means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ―spouse‖ refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.17

The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives (―Judiciary
Committee‖) claimed that four governmental interests were advanced by
the passage of DOMA: ―(1) defending and nurturing the institution of
traditional, heterosexual marriage; (2) defending traditional notions of
morality; (3) protecting state sovereignty and democratic self-governance;
and (4) preserving scarce government resources.‖18 Members of the 104th

13. See generally Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996)
(codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).
14. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii Supreme Court determined the trial
court erred in granting Lewin‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the plaintiffs‘
complaint. Id. at 68. The court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the
state could overcome the presumption that its marriage statute is unconstitutional. Id.
15. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES 116–17 (2006). However, according to the
dissenting legislators on the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, recognition of samesex marriage was not imminent in Hawaii because the trial court was not scheduled to start hearing the
remanded case until September of 2006. H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 36 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2939. Therefore, the dissenters stressed that there was ―plenty of time to legislate
with more thought and analysis.‖ Id. In a somewhat ironic twist, Hawaii voters, one year after DOMA
was enacted, voted to amend Hawaii‘s constitution so that the Hawaiian ―legislature shall have the
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.‖ HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
16. See Whitten, supra note 5, at 440.
17. Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 110 Stat. at 2419.
18. H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 12, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2916. Arguably, the fourth
governmental interest advanced by the committee—preserving scarce government resources—seems to
be the one that would be most considered in a constitutional challenge of DOMA relying on the
Spending Clause. According to the Judiciary Committee, the Federal Government ―currently provides
an array of material and other benefits to married couples in an effort to promote, protect, and prefer the
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Congress believed that recognition of same-sex marriages by Hawaii would
also have ―profound implications for federal law‖ because the word
―marriage‖ appears in over 800 federal statutes and regulations and the
word spouse appears over 3,100 times.19 Before the ―dawn‖ of same-sex
marriages, the Federal Government simply relied on state law marriage
definitions because there was no federal definition of marriage.20 Overall,
the Judiciary Committee believed that the federal definition of marriage set
forth in Section Three of DOMA only constituted a ―narrow federal
requirement‖ and that the ―federal government [would] continue to
determine marital status in the same manner it does under current law.‖21
Essentially, Section Three of DOMA codifies Congress‘ intent to prohibit
same-sex couples from receiving federal benefits conditioned on marital
status.22
B. A Brief Overview of Spending Clause Jurisprudence
The Constitution allows Congress to ―provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States.‖23 From this clause, commonly
referred to as the Spending Clause, derives Congress‘ spending power.
―Much of federal policy is implemented through spending legislation,
which disburses funds to states upon certain conditions.‖24 The following is
an overview of two of the seminal Supreme Court cases determining
whether Congress can attach conditions to money provided to the states.
―[N]ot surprisingly, challenges to the spending power came soon after
Congress began enacting social programs.‖25 In 1936, the Court considered
whether provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (―AAA‖)
violated the Constitution.26 According to the Court, the provision of the
AAA authorizing the expenditure of funds raised by a processing tax on
institution of marriage.‖ H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 18, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2922.
Therefore, the Judiciary Committee seems to imply that Congress can condition the provision of benefits
to married couples on states‘ compliance with DOMA‘s federal definition of marriage.
19. H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 10, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2914.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 31, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2935 (alteration in original).
22. STRASSER, supra note 12, at 150.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
24. Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement Rule for
Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2010).
25. James V. Corbelli, Note, Tower of Power: South Dakota v. Dole and the Strength of the Spending
Power, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1988).
26. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 53 (1936). At issue in Butler was whether the AAA could
levy processing taxes against agricultural commodities. Id. at 55. The AAA also provided that money
raised from the processing tax could be used by the Secretary of Agriculture for various expenditures,
including expanding markets, providing tax refunds, and removing surplus agricultural products. Id. at
56.
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agricultural products was allowable under the Spending Clause.27 The
Court further determined that because Congress did not have direct power
to enforce commands on farmers, it could not ―indirectly accomplish those
ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance.‖28 In considering the
constitutionality of the AAA, the Court found it necessary to consider
interpretations of the Spending Clause put forth by two Framers—James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton.29 Madison believed Congress‘ spending
power ―must be confined to the enumerated legislative fields committed to
the Congress . . . Hamilton, on the other hand, maintained the clause . . . [is]
limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the
general welfare of the United States‖30 and, thus, not constrained by the
enumerated powers of Congress listed in Article I. Accordingly, the Court
adopted the Hamiltonian view of the Spending Clause.31
Forty-one years later, the Court ―confirmed Butler‘s broad vision of the
federal spending power.‖32 In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a federal statute that directed the Secretary of
Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funding from
states that did not change their minimum drinking age to twenty-one.33 The
Court ruled that the statute was ―within constitutional bounds even [though]
Congress [could] not regulate drinking ages directly.‖34 The Dole Court
identified four limitations on Congress‘ power under the Spending Clause:
(1) the power must be exercised for the general welfare; (2) Congress must
fashion conditions on states‘ receipt of federal money unambiguously so
that states can knowingly choose whether or not to accept the money; (3)
conditions on federal grants must be germane to the purpose served by the
27. Id. at 62.
28. Id. at 74.
29. See id. at 65–66.
30. Id. (alteration in original).
31. Id. at 66. However, the Court‘s discussion of the two competing views on the Spending Clause was
dicta because of its decision to hold the AAA unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1927 (1995).
Ironically, even though the Court gave its unanimous approval to Hamilton‘s interpretation of the
Spending Clause, it found the AAA unconstitutional in a manner that ―seemed logically consistent only
with Madison‘s approach.‖ Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1112; see also David E. Engdahl, The Spending
Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1994).
However, the majority Justices in United States v. Butler, the 1936 case that first
explicitly endorsed Hamilton‘s view, manifestly did not [understand Hamilton‘s view] . .
. . [T]hey declared that Hamilton had it right but so misunderstood him that they actually
decided the case according to the contrary, restrictive Madisonian view.
Id.
32. Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole
Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163, 168 (2001).
33. 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
34. Id. at 206 (alterations in original).
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national programs; and (4) ―other constitutional provisions may provide an
independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds‖35 The Court also
suggested a fifth limitation: Congress cannot set a condition that coerces
states into complying.36 Since Dole, the Court has never found a spending
condition unconstitutional because it is barred by another constitutional
provision.37
III. RULING DOMA UNCONSTITUTIONAL: AN OVERVIEW OF JUDGE
TOURO‘S OPINION IN MASSACHUSETTS
A. Underlying Facts Involved in Massachusetts
On July 8, 2009, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (―Massachusetts‖)
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts challenging the constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA
as applied to Massachusetts.38 Specifically, Massachusetts alleged that
―DOMA interferes with the Commonwealth‘s exclusive authority to
determine and regulate the marital status of its citizens.‖39 Furthermore,
Massachusetts argued that ―Section 3 of DOMA imposes conditions on the
Commonwealth‘s participation in certain federally funded programs that
require the Commonwealth to disregard marriages validly solemnized under
Massachusetts law.‖40

35. Id. at 207–08. Dole is considered to be the ―leading case dealing with the constitutionality of
conditional spending by Congress.‖ Earl M. Maltz, Sovereignty, Autonomy and Conditional Spending, 4
CHAP. L. REV. 107, 108 (2001).
36. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. According to the Court, a grant becomes coercive when it ―pass[es] the point
at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖ Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 590 (1937)).
37. See Angel D. Mitchell, Comment, Conditional Federal Funding to the States: The New Federalism
Demands a Close Examination for Unconstitutional Conditions, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 161, 178 (1999);
see also Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1162. In 2003, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
Children‘s Internet Protection Act (―CIPA‖), which required public libraries to adopt a policy of using
Internet filters as a condition of receiving federal funding. United States v. Am. Library Ass‘n, 539 U.S.
194, 201 (2003). Specifically, the Court considered whether the conditions set forth in CIPA would
require public libraries to violate the First Amendment in order to receive federal funding. Id. at 203.
The Court determined that CIPA did not impose an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal
funding by public libraries because ―‗when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a
program it is entitled to definite the limits of that program.‘‖ Id. at 211 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
38. Complaint at 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.
Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09–cv–11156–JLT).
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 2–3.
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In its Complaint, Massachusetts alleged that the federal definition of
marriage contained in Section Three of DOMA affects two major programs
operated by the Commonwealth. First, Massachusetts argued the definition
of marriage set forth in DOMA affected the commonwealth‘s
administration of its Medicaid program known as MassHealth.41
MassHealth is ―jointly funded by the federal government and the
Commonwealth‖ but is ―administered solely by Massachusetts.‖42 After
Massachusetts began recognizing same-sex marriages,43 the Federal
Government informed Massachusetts that ―it must apply the federal
definition of marriage, as provided in DOMA, when assessing eligibility for
Medicaid benefits.‖44 Currently, Massachusetts is required to cover the
entire cost of MassHealth coverage provided to those individuals in samesex marriages who, but for DOMA, would qualify for Medicaid benefits but
are still covered by MassHealth.45 Overall, Massachusetts alleged that
about $2.37 million in federal funding is unavailable for MassHealth costs
because of DOMA.46 According to Massachusetts:
DOMA creates an unconstitutional dilemma . . . by requiring MassHealth to
choose between . . . violating the Equal Protection Clause . . . by applying
DOMA‘s federal definition of marriage in order to receive federal funding and .
. . losing [federal funding participation] for otherwise eligible individuals and
risking enforcement for non-compliance . . . if MassHealth continues to treat all
married individuals equally in assessing . . . eligibility.47

Second, Massachusetts alleged that DOMA‘s federal definition of
marriage affects the ―operations of veterans‘ cemeteries at Agawam and
Winchendon, Massachusetts, by the Massachusetts Department of Veterans
Services (―DVS‖).‖48 Only veterans, their spouses, and their children are
eligible for burial at these two cemeteries.49 The two cemeteries have been
maintained and improved through the receipt of federal funding provided
by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (―VA‖).50 After
Massachusetts began to recognize same-sex marriages, the VA informed
Massachusetts that it would be entitled to recapture federal funding
provided to DVS if Massachusetts should decide to bury the same-sex
41. See id. at 14–15.
42. Id. at 14.
43. See generally Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
barring recognition of same-sex civil marriage violates the Massachusetts Constitution).
44. Complaint, supra note 38, at 16.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 18 (alteration in original).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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spouse of a veteran at the cemeteries.51 When Massachusetts filed its
complaint, DVS had already pre-approved an application for burial
submitted by a veteran and his non-independently eligible same-sex
spouse.52 According to Massachusetts:
DOMA creates an unconstitutional dilemma for the Commonwealth by
requiring DVS to choose between . . . violating the Equal Protection Clause . . .
by refusing burial of the same-sex spouse of Massachusetts veterans in a
Massachusetts veterans‘ cemetery and . . . risking enforcement for noncompliance by the VA if DVS continues to apply the state definition of
marriage in assessing eligibility for burial in a veterans‘ cemetery. 53

In its Complaint, Massachusetts alleged that Section Three of DOMA
violates both the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause of the
Constitution.54 Because of these alleged violations, Massachusetts sought
both ―declaratory and injunctive relief for the narrow but critical purpose of
enabling [the Commonwealth] to define marriage within its own
boundaries.‖55
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
In arguing for summary judgment, Massachusetts challenged Section
Three of DOMA under both the Tenth Amendment and the Spending
Clause.56 Specifically, Massachusetts argued that DOMA violates the
Spending Clause because Section Three is independently barred by the
Equal Protection Clause and DOMA‘s treatment of same-sex marriages
does not relate to the purposes served by MassHealth and the veterans‘
cemetery programs.57

51. See id. at 20. The only way that a same-sex spouse would be eligible for burial is if he or she was
―independently eligible;‖ that is, if he or she was also a veteran. See id.
52. Id. at 21.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 22, 24. For purposes of this Note, Massachusetts‘ argument that Section Three of DOMA
violates the Tenth Amendment will not be analyzed.
55. Id. at 3 (alteration in original).
56. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss Complaint and in
Support of Commonwealth‘s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of
Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Law].
57. See generally id. at 22–39. Included in this argument is Massachusetts‘ claim that the court should
apply ―heightened scrutiny‖ to classifications based on sexual orientation. See id. at 31–36. In Gill v.
Office of Personnel Management, Judge Tauro determined that DOMA does not even meet the ―highly
deferential rational basis test.‖ 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010). Therefore, this Note will not
address Massachusetts‘ argument that a heightened standard of review is necessary.
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1. DOMA Requires Massachusetts to Violate the Equal Protection Clause
As stated previously, Congress‘ power to impose spending conditions
upon the states is not absolute because spending conditions may not
independently violate another provision of the Constitution.58
Massachusetts contended that ―[t]he fact that [it] has chosen to sacrifice
federal funding by violating the terms of federal programs, rather than
violate the Constitution, reinforces the fact that DOMA conditions federal
spending on a constitutional violation.‖59 Specifically, Massachusetts
claimed that Section Three of DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause
because it upsets the previous status quo of ―federal incorporation of state
marital status determinations,‖ because it ―permanently denies same-sex
married couples [all] federal marriage-based . . . benefit[s], because it
actually makes administration of relevant federal programs more difficult,
and because DOMA was enacted based on animus against homosexuals.60
2. DOMA‘s Treatment of Same-Sex Marriages Has No Relation to the
Purposes Served by MassHealth and the Veterans‘ Cemetery Programs
Additionally, Congress‘ power to impose spending conditions upon the
states is not absolute because any conditions imposed must be sufficiently
related to the specific purpose(s) of the federal spending.61 According to
Massachusetts, Medicaid‘s purpose is to provide medical coverage for
individuals with low incomes, yet DOMA undermines this purpose by
requiring MassHealth to treat ―married individuals in same-sex couples as
single‖ and therefore requiring ―coverage of individuals in high-income
families.‖62 Similarly, the State Cemetery Grants Program provides burial
sites for veterans and their spouses, yet ―DOMA precludes DVS from

58. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987).
59. Memorandum of Law, supra note 56, at 25 (alteration in original).
60. Id. at 27–29 (alteration in original). But see Consolidated Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Further Support of Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss and In Opposition to Plaintiff‘s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 14 n.5, Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-11156JLT) [hereinafter Consolidated Memorandum] (arguing that DOMA is consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause because, inter alia, Congress had a legitimate interest in preserving consistency in
distributing federal benefits based on marital status).
61. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (noting that
conditions Congress attaches to federal funds given to states need to ―bear some relationship to the
purpose of the federal spending; otherwise, of course, the spending power could render academic the
Constitution‘s other grants and limits of federal authority‖).
62. Memorandum of Law, supra note 56, at 37.
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burying same-sex spouses in its cemeteries.‖63 Overall, Massachusetts
claimed that pursuant to DOMA, public funds were being allocated in
discriminatory ways unrelated to the purposes of the federal programs.64
C. Judge Tauro‘s Opinion- DOMA Violates the Spending Clause
Judge Tauro granted Massachusetts‘ motion for summary judgment on
July 8, 2010, exactly one year after Massachusetts filed its Complaint.65 In
determining that Congress exceeded the scope of its power under the
Spending Clause by enacting DOMA, Judge Tauro recognized that all
federal laws must be based on one or more enumerated powers because
Congress‘ powers are limited.66 Under the Spending Clause, Judge Tauro
reasoned, Congress has broad, but not unlimited, power to condition states‘
receipt of federal moneys.67 With these principles in mind, Judge Tauro
addressed Massachusetts‘ contention for why DOMA ―impermissibly
conditions the receipt of federal funding on the state‘s violation of the
Equal Protection Clause . . . by requiring that the state deny certain
marriage-based benefits to same-sex married couples.‖68
Judge Tauro first addressed Massachusetts‘ argument that DOMA is
unconstitutional because it conditions the receipt of federal funding on a
state‘s violation of the Equal Protection Clause by requiring states to deny
benefits based on marital status to same-sex couples validly married under
state law.69 Relying on his decision in Massachusetts‘ companion case of
Gill v. Office of Personnel Management,70 Judge Tauro determined that
―DOMA plainly conditions the receipt of federal funding on the denial of
marriage-based benefits to same-sex married couples, though the same
benefits are provided to similarly-situated heterosexual couples.‖71

63. Id.
64. See id. at 38. But see Consolidated Memorandum, supra note 60, at 6–8 (arguing that DOMA does
not impose conditions on federal aid received by Massachusetts because eligibility limits placed on
federal programs are per se germane to the purposes served by those programs).
65. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 253 (D. Mass.
2010).
66. Id. at 246.
67. Id. at 245–46.
68. Id. at 248. Because of his determination that ―DOMA imposes an unconstitutional condition on the
receipt of federal funds,‖ Judge Tauro did not address the question of whether DOMA was germane to
the ―specific purposes of Medicaid or the State Cemetery Grants Program.‖ Id. at 249.
69. Id.
70. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
71. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248. Because Judge Tauro ruled in Gill that DOMA fails to pass
the rational basis test, see Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d. at 387, he found that analysis equally applicable in
Massachusetts to determine that DOMA conditions receipt of federal moneys by the states on states‘
violations of the Equal Protection Clause, see Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
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Therefore, because DOMA imposes an unconstitutional condition on states‘
receipt of federal funding, Congress exceeded the scope of its Spending
Clause power by ignoring established restrictions on this authority.72
Judge Tauro explicitly relied on his opinion in Gill to determine that
DOMA imposed an unconstitutional condition on states‘ receipt of federal
funding.73 In Gill, the government specifically ―disavowed Congress‘s
stated justifications for [DOMA].‖74 Instead, the government claimed that
the Constitution allowed Congress to enact DOMA to preserve the status
quo and that DOMA was only an ―incremental response to a new social
problem which Congress may constitutionally employ in the face of a
changing socio-political landscape.‖75 Overall, Judge Tauro determined
these two asserted justifications failed to fulfill the deferential rational basis
test.76
Regarding the government‘s first assertion—that the Constitution
permitted Congress to enact DOMA to preserve the status quo—Judge
Tauro determined that this justification ―relie[d] on a conspicuous
misconception of what the status quo was at the federal level in 1996‖
because before DOMA, the Federal Government recognized any marriage
valid under state law for federal purposes.77 Furthermore, even if one
assumes that DOMA succeeded in preserving the federal status quo, this
assumption merely describes what DOMA does instead of providing a
justification.78
Judge Tauro also rejected the government‘s other assertion that DOMA
is only an incremental response to a growing social problem. Instead of
providing incremental ―relief‖ DOMA constitutes a ―comprehensive sweep
across the entire body of federal law‖ and it is impossible to believe that a
desire for consistency provides a sufficient justification for its enactment.79
As Judge Tauro stated, ―Federal agencies are not burdened with the
administrative task of implementing changing state marriage laws—that is a
job for the states themselves. Rather, federal agencies merely distribute
federal marriage-based benefits to those couples that have already obtained
state-sanctioned marriage licenses.‖80 Therefore, according to Judge

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248–49.
Id. at 248.
Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (alteration in original).
Id. at 390.
See id. at 387, 390.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id.
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Tauro‘s conclusion that ―irrational prejudice‖ was the only motivation for
distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-sex marriages, Section Three
of DOMA as applied to Massachusetts violated the ―equal protection
principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment.‖81
On October 12, 2010, the government filed a notice of appeal of Judge
Tauro‘s opinion in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts.82 The appeal will be heard by the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.83
IV. DOES SECTION THREE OF DOMA CLASSIFY OR COERCE?: A CALL FOR
A NEW VIEW OF THE SPENDING CLAUSE IN THE WAKE OF MASSACHUSETTS
As mentioned above, Judge Tauro determined that DOMA, through its
definition that for federal purposes a marriage only exists between one man
and one woman, induced Massachusetts to violate its citizens‘ equal
protection rights in order to receive federal funding and therefore imposed
an unconstitutional condition.84 In so determining, Judge Tauro relied on
the Dole Court‘s conclusion that Congress may not enact legislation under
the Spending Clause that imposes unconstitutional conditions on the receipt
of federal funding.85 Since the Court‘s decision twenty-three years ago in
Dole, many commentators have suggested that it is time for the Court to
reconsider its interpretation of the Spending Clause, particularly in the wake
of the Court‘s decisions in New York v. United States86 and Printz v. United
States.87 After all, if Congress cannot directly commandeer states and state
officials to execute federal laws, why should Congress be able to indirectly
commandeer states through Spending Clause legislation?88 According to

81. Id. at 397. Of course, the Fifth Amendment lacks an Equal Protection Clause like the one included
in the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Supreme Court has noted that ―the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually
exclusive.‖ Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
82. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010),
appeal docketed, No. 10–2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 2010).
83. Id.
84. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248–49.
85. Id. at 249. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).
86. See generally 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that monetary and access incentives provided to
states through the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act were constitutional but that the Act‘s ―taketitle‖ provision, which required states to either accept ownership of their radioactive waste or enact
regulations according to Congress‘ instructions, violated the Tenth Amendment).
87. See generally 521 U.S. 898, 934–35 (1997) (holding that Congress could not commandeer state
officers to execute Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act by requiring them to conduct background
checks on prospective handgun purchasers).
88. See Whitten, supra note 5, at 458 (arguing that Congress‘ use of ―back-door commandeering‖
through Spending Clause legislation is similar to the ―coercive congressional regulation condemned in
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some commentators, there are actually two types of conditions when
referring to constitutional limitations on federal spending—classifying
conditions and coercive conditions.89 This Part examines Section Three of
DOMA as both a classifying and coercive condition and determines that if
the Court were to adopt this new view of the Spending Clause, the
condition presented by DOMA would still be unconstitutional.
Of the two types of conditions—classifying and coercive—the latter
―tends to implicate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions‖ while the
former does not.90 Professor Albert Rosenthal refers to classifying
conditions as those that specify the ―eligible recipients of the federal grant
in terms at least partly beyond their control;‖ conversely, coercive
conditions are those that have ―the likely effect (and usually the purpose as
well) of influencing [recipients‘] conduct.‖91 As mentioned before, DOMA
provides that when determining the meaning of any federal statute or
regulation, the word ―marriage‖ means ―only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife,‖ and the word ―spouse‖ is used
to denote ―only [ ] a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.‖92
A. DOMA Unconstitutionally Classifies Based on Sexual Orientation
At first glance, it appears that Section Three of DOMA only sets forth a
classifying condition to be applied to all statutes implicating federal
funding93—in other words, for those funding statutes that consider marital
or spousal status, only those marriages between a man and wife and those
spouses who are opposite-sex are to be considered. Rosenthal argues that
―[a]ny constitutional difficulties that arise with [classifying conditions] will
generally relate to questions of equal protection.‖94 Here, DOMA‘s federal
definition of marriage in Section Three does give rise to equal protection
issues because it directly distinguishes between heterosexual and
homosexual marriages.95 Therefore, the Court should consider whether this

New York and Printz‖).
89. E.g., Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1114.
90. Id. at 1116. But cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1496 (1989) (―Unconstitutional conditions inherently classify potential beneficiaries into two groups:
those who comply with the condition and thereby get better treatment, and those who do not.‖).
91. Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1114 (alteration in original).
92. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (alteration in original).
93. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).
94. Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1116 (alteration in original).
95. See Defense of Marriage Act, § 3(a), 110 Stat. at 2419.
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classifying condition satisfies equal protection principles; if not, then it
should serve as an independent constitutional bar to Congress‘ Spending
Clause power.
Anytime an equal protection violation is alleged, the Court must
determine which standard of review to apply to the classification.
According to Judge Tauro, Section Three of DOMA ―fails to pass
constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational basis test.‖96
Furthermore, he was ―convinced that ‗there exists no fairly conceivable set
of facts that could ground a rational relationship‘ between DOMA and a
legitimate government objective.‖97 If the Court eventually grants certiorari
to Massachusetts and Gill, it will need to determine which standard of
review to apply to the classification set forth in Section Three of DOMA.
The Court has only considered an equal protection challenge to a
classification based on sexual orientation once, when it considered the
constitutionality of ―Amendment 2‖ to Colorado‘s state constitution.98
Amendment 2 repealed all ordinances prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and also ―prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or
judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect
[homosexuals].‖99 The Court ruled that Amendment 2 failed to meet even
the rational basis test, stating:
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry. First, the
amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group, an exceptional and . . . invalid form of
legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but an animus
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.100

96. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010).
97. Id. (quoting Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2005)) (internal citation omitted).
98. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). In 2003, the Court was presented with an equal
protection challenge to a ―Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate conduct.‖ Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). However, the Court declined
to address the equal protection argument because it determined the issue should be resolved with
reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 564. Notably, in her
concurrence, Justice O‘Connor argued that the Texas statute was unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because ―[a] law branding one class of persons as
criminal based solely on the State‘s moral disapproval of that class . . . runs contrary to the values of the
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of review.‖ Id. at 585 (O‘Connor, J.,
concurring).
99. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (alteration in original).
100. Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
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Here, the definition of marriage codified in Section Three of DOMA is a
classifying condition based on sexual orientation because it classifies
between heterosexual and homosexual marriages.101 Furthermore, as
discussed above, the legislative history seems to suggest that the primary
reason Congress enacted DOMA was because of animus toward
homosexuals.102 Section Three of DOMA is analogous to Colorado‘s
Amendment 2 at issue in Romer—which the Romer Court found failed even
the deferential rational basis test.103 Both provisions specifically single out
a specific group of people—homosexuals—and essentially impose ―a broad
and undifferentiated disability.‖104 In Romer, Colorado‘s Amendment 2 left
homosexuals open to discrimination on any basis with no remedy to provide
recourse.105 Similarly, Section Three of DOMA forecloses homosexuals in
same-sex marriages from receiving federal benefits conditioned on marital
status, even if those same-sex marriages are valid under state law.106
Therefore, if the Court chooses to uphold Judge Tauro‘s application of the
rational basis test, it could directly rely on its decision in Romer for support.
However, two federal courts of appeals have suggested that the Court
should apply a heightened standard of review to classifications involving
sexual orientation.107 Furthermore, there are two different approaches to
applying strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis. First, a court can
determine that classifications discriminating based on sexual orientation are
―suspect‖ and that homosexuals constitute a ―suspect class.‖108 If the Court
chooses to apply strict scrutiny in this fashion to Section Three of DOMA,
it would need to determine whether homosexuals constitute a class that has
experienced a history of ―purposeful unequal treatment.‖109 At least two
lower courts have already recognized that homosexuals as a group have

101. See Whitten, supra note 5, at 440–41.
102. See supra Part II.A.
103. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 624–25.
106. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified
as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).
107. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (―All classifications
based on sexual orientation appear suspect, as the evidence shows that California would rarely, if ever,
have a reason to categorize individuals based on their sexual orientation. Here, however, strict scrutiny
is unnecessary. Proposition 8 fails to survive even rational basis review.‖); cf. Witt v. Dep‘t of the Air
Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821–22 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that heightened scrutiny should apply to
substantive due process claims involving the military‘s ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ policy).
108. Witt, 527 F.3d at 824 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see HOWARD
BALL, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INTIMATE LIVES OF AMERICANS 61 (2002) (arguing that
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class for which is needed a compelling state interest to uphold a
statute classifying on the basis of sexual orientation).
109. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
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experienced discrimination and prejudice solely because of their sexual
orientation.110 Second, ―[c]lassifications that impinge on a fundamental
right are subject to strict scrutiny when challenged as a violation of equal
protection.‖111 In Gill, the plaintiffs argued for strict scrutiny because
―DOMA burdens Plaintiffs‘ fundamental right to maintain the integrity of
their existing family relationships.‖112 They reasoned that DOMA violates
their rights to maintain the integrity of their marriages—and the Court has
already held that marriage is a fundamental right.113 Therefore, if the Court
chooses to apply strict scrutiny in this fashion, it is highly likely the Court
will uphold Judge Tauro‘s decision that Section Three of DOMA is
unconstitutional under the equal protection principles of the Fifth
Amendment.
In sum, if the Court views the federal definition of marriage set forth in
Section Three of DOMA as a classifying condition, it is likely to find it
violates equal protection principles whether rational basis, heightened
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny is applied. If the Court chooses to apply rational
basis, it can defer to the findings of two federal district courts.114 Similarly,
if it chooses heightened or strict scrutiny, it can defer to the findings of two
lower courts.115 Accordingly, finding a violation of equal protection
principles automatically triggers Dole‘s fourth limitation on Congress‘
Spending Clause power—Congress cannot enact spending legislation when
another constitutional provision provides an ―independent bar to the
conditional grant of federal [money].116 Therefore, when DOMA‘s federal
definition of marriage is viewed as a classifying condition, it presents a
―constitutional difficulty‖ based on equal protection and therefore is beyond
Congress‘ power to enact under the Spending Clause.117

110. Witt, 527 F.3d at 824–25 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―Suffice it to say
that homosexuals have ―experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment [and] been subjected to
unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.‖
(quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996
(―The evidence at trial shows that gays and lesbians experience discrimination based on unfounded
stereotypes and prejudices specific to sexual orientation.‖).
111. Witt, 527 F.3d at 825 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338–39 (1972)).
112. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010).
113. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (The ―freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.‖). But see
BALL, supra note 108, at 61 (arguing that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage).
114. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997; Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387.
115. Witt, 527 F.3d at 824–26 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Perry, 704 F. Supp.
2d at 997.
116. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
117. See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1116.
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B. DOMA‘s Definition of Marriage Impermissibly Coerces States To
Accept Federal Grants
Even though the argument above establishes that Section Three of
DOMA presents an unconstitutional classifying condition, it can also be
labeled as a coercive condition because it ―has the likely effect . . . of
influencing their conduct, with the promised carrot of federal funds for
those who avoid the type of activity that Congress seeks to discourage or
the threatened stick of denial of funds for those who refuse.‖118 Therefore,
because the Court could determine that Section Three of DOMA does not
violate equal protection principles under whichever standard of review the
Court chooses, it is necessary to determine whether DOMA is the
equivalent of an unconstitutional coercive condition.
1. The Problems of Current Spending Clause Jurisprudence Concerning
Coercion
Under current Spending Clause jurisprudence, ―Congress can remain
within the limits of the spending power simply by conditioning the receipt
of federal grants on the state‘s compliance with federal mandates. A
condition . . . cannot actually coerce a state, which always has the
opportunity to decline the benefit and avoid the accompanying federal
regulation.‖119 However, Dole suggests that when analyzing federal
spending legislation, coercion occurs when states simply cannot afford to
―resist the lure of federal funding.‖120 Furthermore, the Court has indicated
that a determination of whether coercion exists turns on the amount of
federal grant money available.121 Realistically, the observation that states
always have the opportunity to decline federal funding can ―readily be
rejected if the condition is deemed oppressive‖ because ―the budgets of
state and local governments [are] now so greatly dependent on federal
money.‖122 Therefore, courts should not just defer to Congress‘ extensive
118. Id. at 1114.
119. Donald J. Mizerk, Note, The Coercion Test and Conditional Federal Grants to the States, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (1987); see also Derek C. Araujo, A Queer Alliance: Gay Marriage and the
New Federalism, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 200, 240 (2006) (―A state that accepts federal funds to
which Congress has attached conditions might be thought to offer its consent to congressional
regulation. After all, the state retains the ability to make a political decision not to accept the funds.‖);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 103 (2001) (―The use of the
spending power is different because states always retain a choice, unpleasant as it may be to give up the
federal funds.‖).
120. McConville, supra note 32, at 172.
121. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987).
122. Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1162 (alteration in original); see also Araujo, supra note 119, at 243
(―In practical terms, asking states to reject even small amounts of federal funding is often asking the
impossible.‖).

2011]

TILL DEATH (OR DOMA) DOES US PART

629

spending power whenever funding represents an extensive source of state
revenue; instead, courts must determine whether the condition at issue
impermissibly coerces the states to comply.123
Furthermore, current Spending Clause jurisprudence undermines
federalism.124 Specifically, it causes reductions in ―states‘ responsiveness
to the preferences of their inhabitants and . . . competition between states to
become more attractive to inhabitants.‖125 The Dole Court‘s view of the
Spending Clause negatively impacts federalism because it causes aggregate
social welfare to decline.126 This broad interpretation of congressional
spending authority provides Congress with the authority to drive the states
toward a single nationwide policy and essentially ignore those states who
adopt differing public policies.127 Therefore, when determining whether a
specific federal spending condition impermissibly coerces the states,
meaningful, judicially-enforceable limitations on the spending power are
needed to ―provide[ ] ‗outlier‘ or ‗minority‘ states protection from federal
homogenization in areas in which they deviate from the national norm,
whether that deviation is to the left or right of the political center.‖128
2. A New Test to Determine When a Funding Condition is
Unconstitutionally Coercive
To combat these effects, several commentators have suggested variations
on a new test to determine if a condition attached to federal funding is

123. See Mitchell, supra note 37, at 184.
124. See Douglas A. Wick, Note, Rethinking Conditional Federal Grants and the Independent
Constitutional Bar Test, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (2010).
125. Id.
126. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon
its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459,
471 (2003). Baker and Berman believe that ―in the absence of a nationwide consensus, permitting stateby-state variation will almost always satisfy more people than would the imposition of a uniform
national policy.‖ Id.
127. Id. at 472.
128. Id. at 470. But see Baker, supra note 31, at 1951 (―Of course, increased diversity among the states
is not always a good thing. Some states, for example, might have laws expressing a moral preference
that a majority of Americas consider unacceptable, and which a conditional offer of federal funds might
persuade these states to repeal.‖). According to Baker‘s argument, one could argue that because five
states (Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont) and the District of Columbia
recognize same-sex marriage, Congress enacted DOMA and its federal definition of marriage in order to
persuade these jurisdictions to repeal their laws by conditioning the receipt of federal funding on the
application of this definition of marriage. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MARRIAGE
EQUALITY AND OTHER RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION LAWS (2010), available at
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (identifying that Connecticut,
the District of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples).
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impermissibly coercive and therefore violates the Constitution.129 This new
test states that any offers of federal funding to the states that would regulate
them in ways that Congress cannot directly legislate through its enumerated
powers would be presumed invalid.130 This version of the unconstitutional
conditions test would only apply when analyzing funding the government is
permitted to distribute, not when analyzing those benefits the government is
compelled to provide.131 Essentially, a court considering whether a
condition attached to a grant of federal money is coercive must compare
that condition to the Constitution.132 If the action required by the condition
―would be unconstitutional when undertaken directly by the federal
government,‖ it is presumed to violate the independent constitutional
provision limitation established by the Dole Court.133 According to
Professor Baker, this presumption can be overcome if the government
sufficiently shows that the condition constitutes ―reimbursement spending‖
rather than ―regulatory spending.‖134 Finally, any conditional grants that
burden either individual or states‘ rights must be analyzed with ―exacting
judicial scrutiny.‖135
3. Applying the New Test to Section Three of DOMA
When considering Section Three of DOMA under this new test, a court
must determine whether DOMA‘s definition of marriage applies to funding
―the government is permitted… not compelled,‖ to distribute.136
Massachusetts argued that Section Three of DOMA, as applied to 38 U.S.C.
129. See Baker, supra note 31, at 1933.
130. See id. at 1962–63; Corbelli, supra note 25, at 1118, 1121; Wick, supra note 124, at 1362.
131. Sullivan, supra note 90, at 1422. However, the reality is that most federal benefits are permissive
under the current scheme. Id.
132. Wick, supra note 124, at 1379.
133. Id.
134. Baker, supra note 31, at 1963.
―Reimbursement spending‖ legislation specifies the purpose for which the states are to
spend the offered federal funds and simply reimburses the states . . . for their
expenditures . . . . Most ―regulatory spending‖ legislation thus includes a simple
spending component which, if enacted in isolation, would be unproblematic under the
proposed test.
Id.
135. Wick, supra note 124, at 1372; see also Baker, supra note 31, at 1923 (―[T]he critical variable is
whether the condition attached to the offered funds, taken alone, impinges on a constitutional right of the
claimant. Conditions that do not affect the claimant‘s exercise of a constitutional right are
unproblematic; conditions that do, however, may or may not be.‖); cf. Sullivan, supra note 90, at 1419
(discussing how the ―central challenge‖ of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is ―explain[ing] why
conditions that ‗indirectly‘ pressure preferred liberties should be as suspect as ‗direct burdens‘ imposed
on those same rights‖). Sullivan also believes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine only protects
those rights depending on the right-holder‘s exercise of some autonomous choice, and only then to those
rights that are recognized and usually subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 1426.
136. See Sullivan, supra note 90, at 1422.

2011]

TILL DEATH (OR DOMA) DOES US PART

631

§ 2408 (the State Cemetery Grants Program (―Program‖)), required
Massachusetts to violate equal protection principles in order to receive
federal funding.137 Under the Program, ―the Secretary [of the VA] may
make a grant to any State for . . . establishing, expanding, or improving a
veteran‘s cemetery owned by the State‖ and for ―operating and maintain
such a cemetery.‖138 A plain reading of this statute suggests that a state is
not obligated to accept this funding; rather, receiving federal funding is
discretionary because the Secretary ―may‖ provide grants to any state
applying under the program.139 This argument would also apply to
Massachusetts‘ contention that DOMA, as applied to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et
seq. (―the Medicaid statute‖ or ―Medicaid‖), requires Massachusetts to
violate equal protection principles by distinguishing between individuals in
same-sex marriages and individuals in opposite-sex marriages for Medicaid
eligibility determinations.140 According to the Medicaid statute, ―sums
made available under this section shall be used for making payments to
States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary [of Health
and Human Services (―HHS‖)], State plans for medical assistance.‖141
Looking at the plain language of the Medicaid statute, it appears that
Medicaid is a voluntary program because states must choose to submit
plans and have them approved by the Secretary of HHS before receiving
federal funding.142 Therefore, Section Three of DOMA does meet the first
part of the test for coercion.
Second, a court must consider whether Section Three of DOMA, when
applied to federal spending statutes, purports to ―regulate the states in ways
that Congress could not directly mandate.‖143 Here, Section Three does
―not actually [direct] the states how to define ‗marriage‘ and ‗spouse‘‖;
instead, Congress is coercing the states to adopt similar definitions to
continue to receive federal funding conditioned on marital status.144
137. Complaint, supra note 38, at 23.
138. 38 U.S.C. § 2408(a)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. III 2010) (alteration in original).
139. See id.
140. Complaint, supra note 38, at 23.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (Supp. III 2010) (alteration in original).
142. See id; cf. Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care: Lessons
from Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 954 (2010) (―Medicaid built on the statutory
framework of the prior cooperative federal/state medical vendor programs but finally succeeded,
through a combination of financial carrots and sticks, in enticing all the states—even the poorest—into
the new program.‖).
143. E.g., Baker, supra note 31, at 1962–63.
144. Whitten, supra note 5, at 457–58 (alteration in original); see also Araujo, supra note 119, at 232
(―In particular, Congress might coax the states into adopting a federal, heterosexual definition of
marriage by threatening to revoke some part of gay-friendly states‘ federal funds.‖). Araujo‘s statement
basically sums up Massachusetts‘ argument because it must either lose federal funding or choose to
violate equal protection principles by applying DOMA‘s federal definition of marriage to receive
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However, the ―whole subject of domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the law of the states, and not to the law of the
United States.‖145 When determining who can receive federal benefits
under a federal statute, the federal government will defer to state laws
regarding domestic relations ―unless Congress clearly mandates
otherwise.‖146 Congress has no enumerated power to direct the states to
recognize certain types of marriages as valid and others as invalid; 147
therefore, Section Three of DOMA presumptively violates the independent
constitutional bar limitation on federal funding propounded by the Dole
Court.
Finally, a court must consider whether this presumption of
unconstitutional coercion can be rebutted by a showing that the condition
constitutes ―reimbursement spending‖ rather than ―regulatory spending.‖148
Again, reimbursement spending only ―specifies the purpose for which the
states are to spend the offered federal funds and simply reimburses the
states … for their expenditures.‖149 When considering whether Section
Three of DOMA specifies the purpose for which the funds are to be used, a
court must consider the substantive federal statute authorizing the federal
funding. Under the State Cemetery Grants Program, the VA can provide
grants for states to use to maintain, expand, and construct veterans‘
cemeteries if the states submit applications for this grant money. 150
Congress has not specifically specified how the states are to use the grant
money to maintain these cemeteries; however, to qualify for a grant a state
must operate the cemetery for veterans, veterans‘ spouses, and minor and
disabled adult children.151 Therefore, the State Cemetery Grants Program
appears to set only a general purpose for the use of the funds. However, it
does not simply reimburse the states for their expenditures because states
submit plans to receive grant money, and any money not used within three
years can be recovered by the United States.152 Therefore, a showing of
reimbursement spending as applied to the State Cemetery Grants Program
should not rebut Section Three of DOMA.

funding. See Complaint, supra note 38, at 14–21.
145. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
146. STRASSER, supra note 12, at 149.
147. Cf. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593–94.
148. Baker, supra note 31, at 1963.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. See 38 U.S.C. § 2408(b) (2006).
151. See 38 C.F.R. § 39.10(a) (2010). ―In order to qualify for a grant, a State veterans cemetery must
be operated solely for the interment of veterans, their spouses, surviving spouses, minor children, and
unmarried adult children who were physically or mentally disabled and incapable of self-support.‖ Id.
152. See 38 C.F.R. § 39.10(d) (2010).
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Determining whether Section Three of DOMA as applied to MassHealth
sets a reimbursement spending condition rather than a regulatory spending
condition requires a bit more analysis. MassHealth is jointly funded by
Massachusetts and the Federal Government but is administered exclusively
by Massachusetts.153 Massachusetts has admitted that ―[i]n general, the
federal government reimburses half of the qualifying health benefits paid
out by MassHealth.‖154 Therefore, from this concession it appears that a
finding of coercion would be rebutted. However, because the Federal
Government has specifically informed MassHealth that it must apply
DOMA‘s definition of marriage when determining eligibility for Medicaid
benefits and because this mandate has caused Massachusetts not to receive
about $2.37 million in federal funding,155 a court should still consider
whether this is reimbursement or regulatory spending.
According to the Medicaid statute, the purpose of providing funds to
those states that have submitted plans for medical assistance is to enable
those states to provide medical assistance to eligible individuals who do not
have the income or resources to cover the costs of necessary medical
services.156 When considering the eligibility of a married individual,
MassHealth combines the assets and income of that individual with those of
his or her spouse.157 Under federal law, Massachusetts must assess married
individuals in same-sex relationships as though they were single rather than
married, yet MassHealth continues to make eligibility determinations
without regard to whether the marriage is between two individuals of the
same sex or two of different sexes.158 Therefore, while the purpose of
Medicaid is to enable states to assist those individuals who do not have
sufficient resources to meet medical costs,159 Congress is not meeting that
purpose by conditioning states‘ receipt of funding for medical assistance
programs on the acceptance of DOMA‘s definition of marriage.
Furthermore, while the Federal Government does reimburse half of the
benefits paid by MassHealth,160 it does not reimburse Massachusetts for
those benefits paid to qualifying individuals who happen to be married to a

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Complaint, supra note 38, at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16–17.
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006); see also Complaint, supra note 38, at 14.
Complaint, supra note 38, at 15.
Id. at 15, 17.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
Complaint, supra note 38, at 15.
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spouse of the same sex.161 Based on these observations, Section Three of
DOMA, as applied to Medicaid benefits, should be classified as an
unconstitutional coercive condition.
C. Distinguishing Congressional Regulation of Polygamy from
Congressional Regulation of Same-Sex Marriage Through DOMA
Supporters of the constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA may argue
that there is no difference between Congress attempting to regulate state
recognition of same-sex marriage and Congress‘ many attempts to regulate
and prohibit the practice of polygamy in the Western territories in the
nineteenth century.162 In his opinion in Massachusetts, Judge Tauro failed
to discuss the congressional history regarding the regulation of polygamy
and how this serves as one instance of Congress attempting to trump the
states‘ abilities to define marriage for themselves.163 Therefore, because the
Court could conceivably determine that Congress‘ attempt to regulate samesex marriage through DOMA is permissible because of Congress‘ past
regulation of polygamy, this Note analyzes how, even when compared to
the regulation of polygamy, Section Three of DOMA still creates an
unconstitutional coercive condition for the receipt of federal funding.
Congress began to regulate the practice of polygamy in the nineteenth
century as ―Mormon theology evolved‖ in the Western territories,
especially Utah.164 In 1862, Congress enacted a law prohibiting the practice
of polygamy in all U.S. territories.165 Twenty years later, Congress made
cohabitation a crime and prohibited those individuals practicing polygamy
from sitting on juries or holding office.166 Five years later, Congress
enacted the Edmunds-Tucker Act, which mandated that plural wives testify
against their husbands and dissolved the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints as a corporation to allow the Federal Government to seize church
property.167 In 1878, the Court upheld the constitutionality of these antipolygamy laws when it ruled that Congress lacked the power under the Free
161. See id. at 17.
162. Cf. Hema Chatlani, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us Down a
Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101, 110–12 (2006)
(summarizing Congress‘ attempts to regulate the practice of polygamy in the territories, especially the
Utah Territory, during the nineteenth century).
163. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass.
2010).
164. Chatlani, supra note 162, at 110–11.
165. Morrill Act, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 (repealed 1910).
166. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, §§ 1, 5, 8, 22 Stat. 30, 30–32 (repealed 1983).
167. Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, §§1, 17, 24 Stat. 635, 635–38 (repealed 1978). The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Edmunds-Tucker Act in 1890. See generally Late Corp. of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
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Exercise Clause to legislate concerning religious opinion and belief but is
free to ―reach actions which were held in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order.‖168 Finally, in order for Arizona, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Utah to gain statehood admission to the United States,
Congress required that they enact anti-polygamy provisions within their
state constitutions.169
As previously mentioned, the Court has recognized that the field of law
regulating domestic relations belongs to the states and not the Federal
Government.170 Yet the multiple laws enacted by Congress during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries targeting practitioners of polygamy
clearly demonstrate one major instance where Congress trumped the states‘
ability to define marriage. Even though Congress did condition statehood
for Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah on the inclusion of antipolygamy provisions in their state constitutions,171 this condition placed
upon statehood can be distinguished from the unconstitutional coercive
condition placed on states‘ receipt of federal money by Section Three of
DOMA.
First, polygamy and same-sex marriage, as institutions, ―are
distinguishable because there are a number of social ills historically present
in polygamy that are not present in same-sex marriages.‖172 Looking at the
history of polygamous marriages in the United States reveals a ―pattern of
underage wives.‖173 Usually, polygamous males ―‗marry [girls] between
the ages of fourteen and sixteen.‘‖174 Sexual abuse and child molestation
are often prevalent in polygamous households.175 Female children do not
168. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). According to the Reynolds Court, ―there has
never been a time in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society.‖
Id. at 165; see also id. at 164 (―Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western
nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature
of the life of Asiatic and of African people.‖).
169. See Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 569 (1910); New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310,
36 Stat. 557, 558 (1910); Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267, 269 (1906); Utah Enabling
Act, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107 (1894). According to one scholar, the portions of these Enabling Acts
requiring the prohibition of polygamy would likely be unenforceable today. See Laura Elizabeth Brown,
Comment, Regulating the Marrying Kind: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Polygamy
Under the Mann Act, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 267, 276 n.73 (determining that ―a portion of the
Oklahoma Enabling Act [was] invalid‖ because Congress could not constitutionally ―require that
Oklahoma‘s state capital be in a particular city‖) (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1911)).
170. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
171. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
172. Chatlani, supra note 162, at 128.
173. Id. at 129.
174. Joseph Bozzutti, The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After Lawrence: Is Scalia a
Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH. LAW. 409, 436 (2004) (quoting Maura Strassberg, The Crime of
Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353, 366 (2003)).
175. Chatlani, supra note 162, at 130.
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receive the same level of education as male children receive, and females
―are raised to believe that women are inferior to men.‖176 Also, many
polygamous families are impoverished because polygamist wives often do
not work outside the home and therefore ―the responsibility for family
finances falls entirely on the patriarchs of the community.‖177 Finally,
―polygamy undermine[s] the basic tenants of a monogamous heterosexual
marriage‖—unity and partnership.178 None of these concerns are present in
a marriage between two consenting individuals of the same sex. Instead, a
same-sex marriage, like a monogamous heterosexual marriage, ―remains
focused on unity and partnership; that is, on the exclusive commitment of
two individuals.‖179 Therefore, both the federal and state governments have
a legitimate interest in prohibiting polygamy to protect women and children
from being exploited through polygamous relationships.
Second, the congressional regulation of polygamy should not be
considered a coercive condition like the condition Section Three of DOMA
places on states‘ receipt of federal spending should be. As an initial matter,
Congress can constitutionally make rules and regulations respecting all U.S.
territories.180 Therefore, Congress could validly prohibit the practice of
polygamy in the Western territories. Conceivably, those territories that
eventually became Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah actively
sought admission to the Union in order to enjoy whatever benefits of
statehood the Constitution and laws of the United States provide.
Therefore, an argument could be made that these territories that were
reaching out to Congress for statehood could only do so by accepting the
condition that their state constitutions contain anti-polygamy provisions.
On the other hand, Section Three of DOMA‘s definition of marriage as
being between one man and one woman conditions the states‘ receipt of
federal funding in order to run federal programs such as Medicaid.181 For
example, Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as a ―cooperative federal/state
medical assistance program for the ‗worthy poor‘—public assistance
recipients and the medically needy.‖182 Even though states had the choice
of opting into Medicaid, they essentially had no choice ―if they wanted to
176. Id. at 131.
177. Id. at 132.
178. Elizabeth Larcano, Note, A “Pink” Herring: The Prospect of Polygamy Following the
Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1065, 1080 (2006).
179. Id.
180. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (―The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .‖).
181. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)); Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1158.
182. Watson, supra note 142, at 953.
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continue to take advantage of federal matching assistance‖ because the
matching programs Medicaid replaced ended on December 31, 1969.183
Medicaid is a classic example of congressional legislation enticing the
states to opt into participating in federal programs to receive federal
assistance—assistance that the states cannot afford to forego in today‘s
society. Therefore, unlike those territories which actively sought admission
to the Union as states, the current nature of federal programs and federal
benefits means that states essentially do not have a choice between
accepting conditional federal funding or foregoing it and still attempting to
provide the same level of assistance to their citizens.184
According to Professor Rosenthal, state decisions regarding marriage and
marital status are largely immune from governmental regulation, but he
does acknowledge that certain decisions relating to marriage could alter
states‘ receipt of federal funding.185 Rosenthal views any conditions based
on marital status attached to the receipt of federal funding as classifying
conditions instead of coercive conditions because ―the amounts of money at
stake are not generally large enough to be decisive with respect to
fundamental choices concerning personal and family life.‖186 However,
Section Three of DOMA is an exception to this observation. Because
receipt of federal funding is attached to states‘ acceptance of DOMA‘s
definition of marriage as between one man and one woman, Massachusetts
has not been able to claim about $2.37 million in federal funding for
MassHealth and faces a decision by the VA to recapture millions in federal
grants should Massachusetts decide to bury a non-independently eligible
same-sex spouse of a veteran in one of the two veterans‘ cemeteries.187
In sum, Section Three of DOMA should be treated as both a classifying
and coercive condition placed on federal funding and therefore is
unconstitutional under both theories. By classifying recipients of federal
funding based on sexual orientation, states that recognize same-sex
marriages must violate equal protection principles to continue to receive
this funding. Even if the Court were to determine, by applying either strict
scrutiny or rational basis, that Section Three of DOMA does not violate
equal protection principles, it still violates the Spending Clause because it
impermissibly coerces states to abide by the federal definition of marriage
as between one man and one woman in order to receive federal funding for
programs such as Medicaid. Supporters of DOMA may argue that
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See id. at 955.
See id.
Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1158.
Id.
See Complaint, supra note 38, at 17–18, 20.
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Congress was allowed to regulate the marriage relationship in the
nineteenth century by prohibiting the practice of polygamy in the Western
territories;188 however, the condition the federal definition of marriage
places on states‘ receipt of federal funding provides states with less choice
than the territories had because the states serve as conduits for federal
programs and cannot adequately support their citizens without federal
funding. Therefore, under this proposed reformulation of Spending Clause
jurisprudence, Section Three of DOMA unconstitutionally classifies and
coerces.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the law as articulated in Dole, Congress might exert financial pressure
on the states to force them to conform state law to DOMA‘s definition of
marriage. Such a move might be entirely constitutional under the Supreme
Court‘s reading of the Spending Clause, even though Congress may not meddle
with the states‘ treatment of marriage through its enumerated power under the
Commerce Clause.189

Unfortunately, this statement describes exactly what Congress has
attempted to persuade the states to do since the enactment of DOMA in
1996. According to the Dole Court‘s Spending Clause interpretation,
Congress can attach any condition it wishes to states‘ receipt of federal
funding as long as that condition is not independently barred by another
constitutional provision.190 Currently, Congress can attempt to create a
single nationwide policy by passing legislation authorizing federal funding
only for states complying with that policy.191 Therefore, current Spending
Clause jurisprudence defies federalism because Congress can essentially
ignore those states with differing public policies.
The Supreme Court is almost certain to grant certiorari to
Massachusetts and Gill because of Judge Tauro‘s determination that
Section Three of DOMA, as applied to Massachusetts, exceeded Congress‘
power under the Spending Clause,192 the Tenth Amendment,193 and the
―equal protection principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment.‖ 194 This
would present the Court with an opportunity to reformulate its Spending

188. See Chatlani, supra note 162, at 111.
189. Araujo, supra note 119, at 235.
190. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).
191. Baker & Berman, supra note 126, at 472.
192. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 248–49 (D.
Mass. 2010).
193. Id. at 252–53.
194. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010).
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Clause jurisprudence so that Congress cannot continue to indirectly
commandeer states through spending legislation when it cannot directly
commandeer states and state officials to execute federal laws.195 Under a
reformulation of the Spending Clause, a court would consider whether a
condition attached to the receipt of federal funding is either an
unconstitutional classifying condition or an unconstitutional coercive
condition.196 Under this view, a court is highly likely to find that the
definition of marriage as a union between one man and one woman as set
forth in Section Three of DOMA is an unconstitutional classifying and
coercive condition.
The Court last interpreted the Spending Clause in 1987—twentythree years ago.197 In the wake of decisions like New York and Printz that
reaffirmed a commitment to federalism, it is high time for the Court to
again address the Spending Clause. If the Court affirms Judge Tauro‘s
opinion and determines that Section Three of DOMA is unconstitutional
under the Spending Clause, not only would the Court demonstrate a
commitment to federalism by prohibiting Congress to use the ―carrot and
stick‖ of money to influence states where it could not do so directly, but it
would also demonstrate a commitment to equality for gay men and lesbians
across America.

195. See Whitten, supra note 5, at 458 (arguing that Congress‘ use of ―back-door commandeering‖
through Spending Clause legislation is similar to the ―coercive congressional regulation condemned in
New York and Printz‖).
196. Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1114–15.
197. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08, 211–12 (1987) (holding that Congress had
authority under the Spending Clause to legislate to encourage states to enact a uniform drinking age of
21 and discussing four limitations on Congress‘ Spending Clause authority).

